Petitioner lawyer sought habeas corpus relief from an order of the Orange County Superior Court

Petitioner lawyer sought habeas corpus relief from an order of the Orange County Superior Court (California), which adjudged him in direct contempt of court and sentenced him to jail and a fine based on california jury instruction civil.

Petitioner lawyer was sanctioned for making insulting comments to the judge during a trial. The judge found petitioner to be guilty of contempt of court and sanctioned the lawyer to jail and fine. Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that the order of the trial court was insufficient on its face to support the jurisdiction of the trial court and it the order was not supported by the record. Petitioner also alleged that under the circumstances of the case, the trial judge was required to refer the charge of the alleged contempt to another judge for adjudication, and the lack of procedure in contempt matters denied the contemnor the equal protection of the laws. The court denied the writ of habeas corpus. The court held that petitioner's statement to the trial judge was contemptuous on its face, the trial judge was not required as a matter of due process to refer the matter of adjudication of the alleged contempt to another judge, and because petitioner was not convicted of criminal offense his summary adjudication of contempt was proper under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1211.

Petitioner lawyer's request for writ of habeas corpus was denied because the evidence supported the contempt finding and sanctions imposed because his statements to the trial judge were contemptuous.

In a support and custody dispute involving an infant child, the Superior Court of Sacramento County, California, granted a motion by respondent mother and disqualified the child's paternal grandfather from representing appellant, the child's father. The father sought review.

The court of appeal held that the trial court acted within its discretion under Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(5), in disqualifying the grandfather. The mother had standing to bring the motion to disqualify, even though she had never been a client of the grandfather's firm. Where an attorney's continued representation threatened an opposing litigant with cognizable injury or would undermine the integrity of the judicial process, the trial court could grant a motion for disqualification, regardless of whether the motion was brought by a present or former client of recused counsel. On the merits, an amalgamation of interrelated factors supported the disqualification. The trial court was very troubled by the fact that confidential facts might have been acquired about the mother and her family's situation because the paternal grandfather's firm represented the maternal grandfather in his own custody dispute, and the mother had filed a declaration in that case. The order was also supported by the almost inevitable prospect that the paternal grandfather would be a percipient witness and by multiple and interconnected family entanglements resulting in an appearance of impropriety.

The court affirmed the trial court's order.